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Changes to the REIQ contract 
 
 
 The Reference Schedule to the REIQ houses and land contract and 
the lots in a Community Titles Scheme (“CTS”) contract has been 
amended to contain provision for disclosure concerning the 
installation of an approved safety switch.  This section will not be 
required to be completed if the land is vacant (in the case of the 
houses and land contract) or if the present use is a commercial use 
(in the case of the lots in a CTS contract). 
 
This amendment is consistent with the introduction into these 
contracts of new definitions in clause 1.1(2) of “Approved Safety 
Switch” and “General Purpose Socket Outlet”, as these terms are 
defined in the Electricity Act 1994 (Qld). 
 
Why have these changes been made to the standard contracts? 
 
New provisions of the Electricity Regulation 1994 (Qld) (“the 
regulation”) concerning safety switches commenced on 1 
September 2002 (from the 1st of October 2002 substantially similar 
provisions are now to be found in the Electrical Safety Regulation 
2002 (Qld).  The objective of these provisions is to prevent fatalities 
and injuries to the public caused by electric shock in domestic 
residences.  The regulations require the transferor of a domestic 
residence (which includes a lot in a community titles plan where the 
lot is used for residential purposes) to disclose to a transferee and 
the chief executive whether an approved safety switch is installed 
for the general-purpose socket outlets (power points) installed in the 
domestic residence on the land.  If an approved safety switch has 
not been installed, the incoming transferee has 90 days to install a 
safety switch from the time of entering into possession (so in 
essence the obligation to install a safety switch is triggered by the 
transfer). 
 
The obligation to notify the transferee and the chief executive 
applies to all transferors who have entered into a contract dated on 
or after 1 September 2002. 
 
What is the effect if the Seller leaves these disclosure boxes in the 
Reference Schedule blank? 
 
First, it should be noted that the regulation does not require that 
disclosure be made in the contract of sale.  Written notice is only 
required prior to the date for possession of the land.  Accordingly 
there would be no impediment to the Seller providing the written 
notice up until this time.  If notice is not given on or before the date 
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of possession for the land the transferor will be liable to a maximum 
penalty of 15 penalty units: S78 (1) Electrical Safety Regulation 
2002 (Qld) 
 
The regulation also provides for a possible fine of 15 penalty points 
($1,125) if the transferor states anything in the notice that is false 
or misleading.  It is suggested that a mere failure to complete a box 
in the Reference Schedule would not be construed as a false or 
misleading statement, particularly given that the obligation may still 
be satisfied in the time contemplated by the regulation.  This 
situation may be contrasted with a situation where the seller states 
falsely that an approved safety switch has been installed. 
 
Apart from potential exposure to a penalty, what is the contractual 
effect if no disclosure is made prior to the date for possession? 
 
The transferor is not required by the regulation to warrant the 
existence or lack of a safety switch or that any existing safety switch 
complies with the requirements of the regulation.  Consequently, a 
failure by the transferor to advise the transferee that the property 
does not have an approved safety switch is unlikely to allow the 
buyer to terminate the contract (other than under the building 
inspection clause) or to claim compensation.  In addition, any failure 
to disclose will not affect a buyer’s obligation to install an approved 
safety switch within 90 days of possession in accordance with s80 
Electrical Safety Regulation 2002 (Qld). 
 
 Also in the Definitions clause of the REIQ contracts, the definition of 
“Balance Purchase Price” has been amended.  This amendment is 
intended to make it clear (by the reference to clause 2.6(11) in the 
houses and land contract and clause 2.6(15) in the lots in a CTS 
contract) that those bank cheques for which the seller is responsible 
may be made the subject of a settlement adjustment. 
 
 Which bank cheques is the seller (rather than the buyer) 
responsible for the cost of? 
 
As mentioned, the relevant clauses are clause 2.6 (11) (houses and 
land) and clause 2.6 (15) (lots in a CTS).  These clauses provide 
that the Buyer is only responsible for the cost of bank cheques 
payable at settlement to the Seller or the Seller’s mortgagee.  The 
cost of bank cheques payable to any other parties is to be borne by 
the Seller. 
 
Certain points should be noted: 
 
The singular reference to mortgagee will include a reference to the 
plural (clause 10.8(1) of the houses and land contract and 11.8(1) 
of the lots in a CTS contract) so if the Seller has more than one 
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mortgagee the Buyer will meet the cost of bank cheques payable to 
such mortgagees. 
 
The reference is to the Seller not to the Seller’s solicitors so the 
Seller will meet the cost of bank cheques made payable to their 
solicitor’s trust account. 
 
 The building and pest inspection report condition has been 
amended.  Clause 4.1 now provides that the contract is conditional 
(if the relevant part of the Reference Schedule is completed) upon 
the Buyer obtaining written building and pest reports (subject to the 
right of the Buyer to elect to obtain only one of these reports). 
 
Clauses 4.4 and 4.5 are new.  Clause 4.4 provides that if requested 
by the Seller, the Buyer must give a copy of the relevant inspection 
report to the Seller without delay.  This right will survive any alleged 
contractual termination by the Buyer. 
 
Clause 4.5 provides that if required under the Building Services 
Authority Act 1991 (Qld), the Inspector must hold a current licence 
under that Act.  This means that an inspection will need to be 
performed by a registered builder or an inspector who is duly 
licensed under the Act to perform such inspections. 
 
 Clause 8.2 (4) has been added to provide that, after reasonable 
notice to the Seller, the Buyer and its consultants may enter the 
Property once to value the Property before settlement. 
 
 A significant change is the addition of clause 10.5(2) (clause 11.5(2) 
of the lots in a CTS contract).  This clause provides that if the 
Finance Date or Inspection Date falls on a day that is not a 
Business Day, then it fall on the next Business Day. 
 
Under the previous editions of the Houses and Land and lots in a 
CTS contracts the relevant clause simply provided that if anything 
was required to be done on a day that was not a business day it 
must be done on the next business day.  The application of this 
clause to obligations under the contract was determined by a 
construction of the words “required to be done on a day”. This will 
have obvious application to a clause like clause 5.1 that requires 
settlement on a particular day. However, clauses like the finance 
and building inspection clauses that require a party to notify of 
finance “by the Finance Date” or to terminate for an unsatisfactory 
building inspection “at any time before 5pm on the Inspection Date” 
may not be subject to the previous version of the clause.  Neither 
clause 3.2 or 4.2 requires a thing to be done on a particular day. 
The buyer is entitled to exercise their rights at any time prior to or 
on the date specified in the contract. It is not the same as 
settlement that is required by the contract to occur on a certain day 
and not before (unless consensual agreement).  The distinction is 
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between an obligation to do something on a certain day (clause 5.1) 
and a right to do something up to a certain day (clauses 3 and 4). It 
is also relevant that in the case of clause 5.1 the date fixed by the 
contract cannot be varied by one of the parties unilaterally, whereas 
in the case of clauses 3 and 4 the buyer has control over the day on 
which notice is given. 
 
Arguably therefore, under the terms of the previous contracts, 
where a finance date or building inspection date fell on a weekend 
or public holiday the buyer would need to exercise their rights prior 
to that particular date.  The previous contractual provision would 
not allow the buyer to exercise their rights on the next business 
day. 
 
The application of clause 10.5 (clause 11.5 in the lots in a CTS 
contract) to the Finance and Building Inspection clauses has now 
been addressed in the latest edition of the contracts. Clause 10.5(2) 
(clause 11.5(2) in the lots in a CTS contract) now provides 
expressly that if the finance date under clause 3 or the inspection 
date under clause 4 fall on a day that is not a business day, then 
the date is deemed to fall on the next business day. 
 
This means that if the finance date falls on a Saturday the buyer is 
entitled to give notice at any time up to 5.00pm on the following 
Monday (assuming that is a Business Day). 
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Conveyancing Case Law Update 
 
 The finance clause clearly contemplates that the financial institution 
will make an offer of finance in terms that the buyer can 
immediately accept. An offer of finance subject to the banks usual 
terms and condition will not be finance approval in accordance with 
clause 3: Jones & Leenders v Smith (Unreported Dist Ct 1 June 
2001). Notification to a seller that finance is approved subject to 
conditions will not be notice that the finance condition is satisfied or 
waived. The notice given should clearly and unequivocally indicate 
that the buyer is satisfied with finance and that the contract is 
unconditional. 
 
If finance approval is obtained the notice of the approval should 
include a statement about the amount of finance obtained, who the 
financier is and state clearly that the finance is satisfactory. Jones & 
Leenders v Smith unreported District Court Cairns White DCJ 2002. 
 
 If instructed prior to a contract for the purchase of land and 
improvements being signed, a solicitor should advise the potential 
purchaser of the prudence of obtaining a building and pest 
inspection.  Would it be negligent not to give such advice? 
 
In Berry v Kanakis & Ors [2002] NSWCA 68 the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal (Meagher, Giles JJA and Ipp AJA) considered a 
similar claim against solicitors who acted on the purchase of a 
house that later became termite infested.  Although the claim was 
ultimately unsuccessful (due to a factual finding that advice to 
obtain a building report would have been otiose as the purchaser 
would have purchased regardless), Giles JA (Meagher JA and Ipp 
AJA agreeing) was prepared to assume that a failure to provide 
such advice was a breach of the contract of retainer. 
 
 The meaning of “attached” for the purposes of the warning 
statement required under the Property Agents and Motor Dealers 
Act 2002 (Qld) was recently considered by Muir J in MP 
Management (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churven [2002] QSC 320.  According 
to Muir J the word attached may have either a broad or restrictive 
meaning. A wide approach may result in a warning statement being 
attached if it is accompanying or is associated with the contract. 
However, in its restrictive sense, attached would require some form 
of joinder, fastening or affixation. His Honour stated that there was 
nothing in s 366 or s 367 which indicated a broad view quite the 
contrary “the aim of the section appears to be to give prominence to 
the warning statement by ensuring that not only is it inseparable 
from the contract proper but that it is the first document to be seen 
by a prospective purchaser when perusing the contract.” 
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His Honour also considered that the intent of the section could be 
complied with without the warning statement being stapled, pinned 
to or bound up with a contract. Muir J gave the example of where 
the warning statement was the first of a number of loose sheets 
placed together in a folder and numbered or otherwise identified as 
the first sheet of the bundle. The suggestion by his Honour being 
that the folder itself serves to attach the bundle of papers together. 
In that case his Honour considered it may be arguable that the 
warning statement was “attached’ to the other documents. In the 
facts before the court that did not occur as the standard REIQ 
contract was used and written at the bottom of the front page of the 
contract was  “page 1 or 6” and the warning statement did not bear 
a number. In addition there were other contractual documents in the 
folder. 
 
The following propositions can be drawn from the judgment: 
 
(a) Generally a warning statement will only be attached to a 
contract if it is physically joined to the contract. 
(b) A warning statement may be attached to a contract where the 
individual sheets of the contract are placed together in a folder 
and the warning statement is the first sheet, provided the face 
of the contract does not indicate that another page is the first 
page of the contract. 
(c) By analogy a contract, which is faxed with the warning 
statement, clearly indicated as the first page of the contract and 
the first page of the fax may be attached to the contract by 
virtue of having been faxed as one document. 
 
Although Muir J has indicated that it may be possible for a warning 
statement to be attached as the first page of a bundle of loose 
pages which all form one contract, each situation will fall to be 
considered on its individual facts and, ideally, practitioners should 
avoid such practices. 
 
A further issue that arose for determination by Muir J was whether 
the right of termination under s 367 of PAMDA (for failure to attach 
the warning statement to the contract) could be waived by the 
conduct of the buyer. Waiver will occur where a person with 
knowledge of two inconsistent legal rights abandons one of those 
rights by acting in a manner inconsistent with that right. The legal 
rights will only be inconsistent if neither one may be enjoyed without 
the extinction of the other and that extinction confers upon the 
elector the benefit of enjoying the other: Sargent v ASL 
Developments Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634 at 641. Muir J in MP 
Management (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churven [2002] QSC 320 considered 
that the right in s 367 was not waived by a buyer who with 
knowledge of the contravention of s 366 continues to perform the 
contract. The reasons for this conclusion were: 
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-The right to terminate under s 367 and the right to continue with 
the contract were not inconsistent rights. His Honour held that s 367 
gave the buyer a “right to terminate the contract at any time before 
the contract settles, irrespective of the nature and extent of the 
performance under the contract and irrespective of the party’s 
conduct by reference to it.” 
 
-The time of election did not arise until the time of settlement and a 
mere intention expressed by conduct not to terminate immediately 
does not divest the buyer of the right to terminate at a later date. 
 
 
 What is the position under the standard contracts where the seller has 
agreed to an extension of the settlement date without specifying that 
time is to remain of the essence?  If the buyer fails to tender on the 
extended date is the seller entitled to immediately terminate the 
contract? 
 
As time was originally of the essence of the contract (clause 6.1 of the 
REIQ contract), a mere extension of time will not usually operate as an 
absolute waiver of that condition, but only substitutes the extended 
time for the original time.  There is no destruction of the essential 
character of the time.  The extended date has the same effect as the 
original date for completion. 
 
Is the result changed by the seller’s failure to expressly specify that 
time is to remain of the essence (contrary to the result in Spencer v 
Cali [1986] 2 Qd R 456)? 
 
An issue such as this recently arose for consideration by Justice 
Wilson in McPhee v Zarb [2002] QSC 4.  Wilson J opined that although 
originally of the essence time ceased to be of the essence when the 
purchasers elected not to terminate and granted an extension of time 
but failed to expressly remake time of the essence.  As such the 
purchasers (in this instance) were not entitled to immediately terminate 
for the seller’s failure to settle on the extended date for settlement, 
rather the obligation of the parties was then to complete within a 
reasonable time. 
 
Notwithstanding this decision it is suggested that the factual context 
facing Justice Wilson may well be distinguished from a mere 
substitution of a new settlement date.  In McPhee v Zarb there was 
some doubt about the actual date that settlement had been extended 
to, neither party tendered performance nor was the conduct of the 
parties consistent with time being of the essence. 
 
Notwithstanding this analysis it is undoubtedly prudent practice when 
granting an extension of any date under the contract to expressly 
remake time of the essence. 
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